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Abstract: There are many different ideas of understanding in the experimental 
economics literature, leading to much debate and conflict between various 
methodological positions. It is argued that a Gricean approach to the notion of 
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provides a robust theoretical background for assessing understanding in practical 
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Introduction
 
The introduction of the experimental method into economics has resulted in a 
revolution in the techniques used and the knowledge gained in the discipline. 
Together with the growth in experimental methods there has been a gradual growth in 
the methodological discussion of experiments and their role in economics. Some of 
this discussion has come from experimentalists themselves either laying down 
“methodological norms” for the field (e.g. Smith 1982) or discussing problems within 
the field (e.g. Starmer 1999). 
   This methodological discussion has become more interesting in recent years 
with the emergence of a variety of “styles” of experimentation and the methodological 
prescriptions which the proponents of these different styles advocate (see the contrast 
between Starmer, Binmore and Loewenstein’s articles in their 1999 Economic Journal 
Symposium). In addition to the discussion within economics there are closely related 
discussions in psychology which are relevant for economic experimentation (See 
Tversky and Kahneman (1996) and Gigerenzer (1996) for an example). 
  For the purposes of this paper I would like to discuss and critique a collection 
of closely related arguments about experimentation which seem to have gained 
widespread currency amongst many experimentalists. These arguments share an 
underlying assumption which concerns the role of understanding in an experimental 
situation. Put simply, it is assumed that, at least in certain experimental situations, 
there is a systematic gap between the subjects’ understanding of the experiment and 
the understanding  of the experimenter. The systematic nature of this gap leads to 
radical conclusions about the correct interpretation of results and the design of 
experiments. 
This requires explanation as it is easy to confuse issues in the discussion 
ahead. Here we will identify a person’s “understanding” of an experiment with  that 
person’s interpretation of  what the experiment’s instructions, format, goals, payoffs 
and the general layout of the experiment mean given a certain level of background 
knowledge. It is assumed that both the experimenter and the subject have their own 
“understandings” of the experiment. We will not bother to question whether there is 
an absolutely “correct” interpretation of this knowledge, but will instead focus on 
whether these interpretations can be brought into agreement.    
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Principally, we will be looking at whether subjects can appreciate the meaning 
of the information communicated by the experimenter although we will also look at 
the situation the other way round. In the former case, the experimenter’s 
understanding is the criterion by which we shall judge whether the subject has made a 
mistake or “misunderstands” the experiment or not. So, for example, a “full 
understanding” would come about when the subject’ understanding is fully aligned 
with that of the experimenter. Similarly a subject “understands” the experiment if she 
has a similar alignment. Another way of looking at this is to see the aim of the paper 
as trying to define and analyse intersubjective understanding between the 
experimenter and subject rather than objective understanding of an absolute meaning. 
  “Understanding” in this context simply means being able to know the meaning 
of the content of a given problem in an experiment. It does not include the 
psychological factors which go into making a decision since these are observed as 
part of the response of the subject rather than part of their understanding of the 
experiment. These psychological factors have a source which is assumed to be distinct 
from their perception of the experiment. This means that the common notion of “self- 
understanding” where people come to terms with their own emotional reactions is not 
included in this definition. Understanding therefore is the interpretation of transferred 
knowledge from the experimenter to the subject. 
If it is assumed that there is a  systematic gap between understandings then 
this can lead to a variety of conclusions depending on how this is interpreted. The two 
interpretations discussed here are as follows: 
 
     a) The subject does not understand the experiment because of a mistake2 (for 
example identifying incorrect social norms (c.f. Binmore 1999)), some perceptual bias 
(Plott 1996) or because the experiment has been presented in the incorrect format (c.f. 
Gigerenzer 1996)). It follows that, while the experiment in its original form may lead 
to normatively incorrect behaviour, this can be corrected by allowing the subjects to 
find out their mistakes for themselves or by putting the experiment in a different 
format. 
 
                                                 
2 In other words the subject’s understanding has deviated from that of the experimenter. 
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 b) The experimenter systematically fails to understand the subjects’ interpretation of 
the experiment. It follows that an interpretation of the subjects’ behaviour as 
normatively incorrect is misconceived. It may simply be the case that the subject is 
normatively correct within his or her own interpretation (see Plott 1996). 
 
It can be seen that these two interpretations have a lot in common. In fact they 
are basically two different ways of saying the same thing except that the location of 
the “error” differs. In (a) it is the subject who is seen as making the error, while in (b) 
it is the experimenter. In both cases there is a belief that the lack of understanding (on 
the part of the experimenter or the subject) is caused by a fundamental flaw in the 
experimental design. There also seems to be an  assumption that subjects are usually 
normatively rational3 even though  an experimenter’s and subject’s understandings 
may not coincide. Finally, it is assumed that only particular types of experiment (if 
any) are “legitimate” as tests of rationality. This effectively blocks off a large number 
of experiments which have been used in the past to demonstrate irrationality (such as 
those used to empirically verify the Allais paradox). 
There is an inevitable mixing of normative and empirical considerations in this 
analysis. This follows from the basic aims of many experiments in economics: to test 
for normatively correct decision- making against the evidence. For example, it  may 
be decided that the experimenter’s interpretation of what is normatively correct in an 
experiment is too “tight” in the sense that it excludes many actions which could be 
seen as normatively justifiable. The normative standards could then be adjusted to 
compensate by allowing more actions to become acceptable. This would then change 
the empirical results in the sense that more actions would become normatively 
correct. 
This normative aspect means that our analysis will stretch beyond the strict 
confines of experimentation to discuss similar issues in decision theory. Broome 
(1991), for example, has made similar arguments to (b) from a normative point of 
view even though he does not explicitly talk about experiments. However, his 
arguments could, in principle, be used as a critique of experimental results in that he 
proposes a normative criterion for observed decisions which is far looser than that 
                                                 
3 This contrasts with the conventional interpretations of “Irrational” results which is that subjects are 
violating normative standards. 
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usually accepted by economists. This would eliminate many refutations of expected 
utility based on conventional criteria. This is discussed in detail later on in this paper.   
  It should be noted that the issue of understanding has not been discussed in 
any great depth in the economics literature. Understanding, when it is introduced, 
often has an ad hoc role or is often not mentioned at all. In spite of this, there are a 
variety of possible criteria for understanding which exist either implicitly or explicitly 
in the literature. However they are not analysed in any great detail and the 
implications are not formally drawn out. Some of these criteria will be discussed in 
this paper.  Having discussed these, it will be argued that arguments about 
understanding in experiments can be put into a more systematic philosophical  
framework based on the writings of Grice (1989).  In that light, some of these criteria 
will be examined and compared with the Gricean model. 
During much of this paper the discussion will centre around experiments in 
either game theory or decision theory. There are many reasons for this. One is that 
this is the area where normative theory (in the form of Expected Utility) has been 
debated most. Another reason is that decision theory has many of the most clear- cut 
results in the literature in which there are regular violations of normative theory. It 
also has the distinction of being the area of experimental economics which has been 
most discussed in the methodological literature. 
The paper will be split into seven sections. Sections 2 and 3 will look at the 
problems outlines above in more detail. Section 4 will introduce the relevant part of 
Grice’s work as well as deriving useful criteria while section 5 will apply these to the 
problems in sections 2 and 3. Section 6 compares these claims with other applications 
of  Grices’ ideas in an experimental context. Section 7 concludes. 
 
  2. The Role of Understanding in Experimental Methodology  
 
There has been considerable interest in practice in the problem of 
understanding amongst experimenters. It would be reasonable to say that the general 
stance of the experimental practitioner towards encouraging the subject to a full 
understanding of the experiment is fairly pragmatic. In general, there is a set of well- 
thought out instructions to explain the experiment, usually in conjunction with 
illustrations of the points made. Many experiments usually have “practice” runs where 
the subjects can try out the mechanics of the experiment. Some also have mini- 
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questionnaires to test understanding of important parts of the experiment. All 
experiments tend to be piloted in sessions where experimenters can ask subjects 
informal questions about the experiment and improve the experiments based on these 
answers. In addition all possible effort is usually made to make the experiment as 
clear and transparent as possible. 
These explicit attempts to ensure understanding are supplemented by other 
aspects of the experiment4. All experiments are incentivised with real and explicit 
incentives where the method of achieving these incentives is obvious to the subject, 
overrides any subjective costs of being in the experiment and is increasing in “good” 
outcomes (Smith 1982). It is an implicit assumption that these incentives will help the 
subject concentrate on the experiment and so more easily understand it. A further 
requirement, particularly in economic experiments, is that there should be no 
deception in the experiment. It is thought that deception lowers trust in the 
experimenter and, it could be argued, prevents subjects from understanding the 
purpose of the experiment. Deception could also increase misunderstanding by 
encouraging subjects to try to “second- guess” the experimenter and guessing wrong. 
It will be appreciated from this that the testing of understanding in economic 
experiments amongst practitioners is more of a craft than a science. Many of these 
aspects are purely pragmatic- the use of examples and testing, for example, could be 
seen as an educational technique applied to experimental research. Some are based on 
ad hoc “feelings” about how to make subjects understand. Others are simply aspects 
of good experimental design which, incidentally, lend themselves to understanding.  
Much of the discussion of understanding in experiments in the more 
methodological literature is based around categorizing various types of error and 
correcting them. Starmer (1999), for example examines Smith’s axioms for a well 
designed experiment (for example the salience of incentives) and then suggests 
solutions for violations of these axioms (Simple designs, greater transparency, 
familiarisation with the setting of the experiment and testing knowledge). Binmore 
(1999) stresses that people should not be put in too complicated a situation, the 
problem should be reasonably simple, incentives should be adequate and there should 
be room for trial- and error learning.    
                                                 
4 This and the following remarks tend to apply more to economics experiments than to psychology 
experiments. 
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 There is no theory of understanding within the experimental economics 
literature apart from the generally accepted observation that, if subjects consistently 
answer experimental questions “correctly” (i.e. in line with Expected Utility Theory) 
then they must understand the experiment5. Logically, it does not follow that if 
subjects do not follow EUT then they do not understand the experiment. There are 
other possibilities, including the possibility that subjects do understand the experiment 
but have a different view of what is normatively correct (they could, for example, be a 
follower of Allais (1953)). 
One theory which has gained wide acceptance in recent years and is closely 
related to a theory of understanding is the Discovered Preference Hypothesis (Plott 
1996, Binmore 1996). A central part of this is the belief that the normative force of 
Expected Utility is such that all reasonable people would want to follow it and in fact 
do so. It follows that if subjects do not seem to outside observers to follow EUT in 
experiments then this must be the result of  one of a series of possible subject errors 
relating to the content or information provided in that particular experiment. 
Understanding, or a lack of it, forms a large part of the reason for why subjects make 
these errors (see Cubitt et al. 2001).  
 This is a radical proposal in that it assumes that Expected Utility is the only 
possible normative standard and that subjects would conform to it rather than any 
other standard6. Furthermore (see Plott 1996) the question of whether subjects do or 
do not have consistent preferences is effectively put beyond testing. It is assumed that 
subjects have consistent preferences and that errors are simply the result of not having 
sufficient knowledge or experience of the particular experiment. Observed errors 
under this view are simply the result of consistent preferences over erroneous 
“frames” of the experiment. 
 This hypothesis is, amongst other things, a critique of the designs of certain 
experiments. If these experiments are “badly designed” then people will not be 
observed to maximise utility. In order to correct the design of such an experiment then 
it will have to incorporate corrective principles such as  transparency, sufficient 
incentives and learning opportunities. Experiments are “transparent” if unnecessary 
                                                 
5 However, even this does not always follow. As Cubitt et al. (2001) point out one can arrive at 
observed EU maximising  even with inconsistent preferences through a process of contamination in 
learning. 
6 This is a dubious assumption from a normative point of view (see Loomes and Sugden (1982) on 
Regret Theory as a normative standard) but also has been heavily criticised in the literature (see 
Kahneman’s (1996) reply to Plott for an example). 
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complications are stripped out and the subject is given sufficient relevant information 
to carry out the task. Incentives have their usual role in experiments of concentrating 
subjects’ minds while learning involves repetition  in order to familiarise the subjects 
with the tasks. 
In essence, the view of understanding taken by the advocates of discovered 
preference is simple. Assume ceteris paribus that subjects make none of the other 
possible types of error apart from errors in understanding7. In this case a subject can 
only be said to understand an experiment if they are observed to maximise Expected 
Utility. If a subject  is not observed maximising Expected Utility then, according to 
this theory, (although as stated above this does not logically follow) the subject does 
not understand a question. It is possible for subjects to systematically misunderstand 
experiments because of the existence of social norms or other framing effects. This 
means that it may be that some aspect of the experiment reminds subjects of some 
norm existing outside the experimental laboratory (or alternatively may cause them to 
“frame” the problem in a different way) and a systematic error may occur as a result 
of following this norm. 
The aspect of the Discovered Preference hypothesis which has been criticised 
most heavily in the literature is that of repetition. According to Binmore (1999), the 
subject may start out making an error, possibly a systematic error. For this reason a 
single game is useless because the subjects do not understand the experiment fully 
and the effects of external “norms” have not been stripped out. The game is only valid 
once it has been repeated several times since, in this way, mistakes will be discovered 
by the subjects and eliminated on future repetitions. This process of “trial and error” 
learning will result in the “true” preferences being discovered after several repetitions. 
This has the effect of reducing “contextual” effects and so increasing the external 
validity of the experiment.  
Tversky (1996)  has criticised this on the grounds that this does not represent 
learning in any meaningful sense since the feedback in such experiments is far richer 
than in the real world environment. To say that such experiments increase external 
validity is peculiar, given how few situations resemble such a narrowly defined 
repetitive situation (see also Starmer 1999). Loewenstein (1999) has also made 
criticisms along these lines, questioning how representative such a situation could 
                                                 
7 Plott seems to assume that most errors are errors in understanding. 
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ever be; how could the sixth repetition be more valid than the first? There is always 
the risk of confounding factors, such as boredom, as a result of repetition which may 
influence certain experiments (such as the ultimatum game8.) 
Cubitt et al.’s critique extends this by noting that repetition increases the 
complexity of a game and thus makes it far more difficult to understand. If the 
instructions for one game are hard to understand then adding on repetitions gives an 
extra layer of complexity which needs to be understood. Furthermore, repetition 
increases the risk of contamination either from a player’s previous play or from the 
play of other people. This increases the possibility of error on the part of the subject 
or may even create a “false positive” of subjects who are not Expected utility 
maximizers but who choose in a way consistent with it. 
 In response to this Cubitt et al. propose that in place of repetition an 
experimenter should concentrate on control of experiments. If subjects do not 
understand an experiment then it must be a failure of control within the experiment. In 
general one should follow the precept that subjects do understand an experiment 
(given that the experiment is simple, instructions are clear etc.) unless one is 
specifically testing for a lack of understanding. If such a test is performed and some 
misunderstanding comes to light then a new control should be introduced to prevent 
this misunderstanding. 
A variant of the “Discovered Preference” hypothesis can be found in the 
psychology literature (see Gigerenzer 1996 and Kahneman and Tversky’s 1996 
reply). According to Gigerenzer much of the work done by psychologists on the 
heuristics and biases programme, as exemplified by Kahneman and Tversky’s work, 
is misplaced. Many of the so- called biases from normative standards in fact disappear 
when the questions are presented in a “suitable” format. The example given is 
Kahneman and Tversky’s “conjunction” problem9. Gigerenzer has shown that, when 
done in the original probability format, the conjunction bias holds but it disappears if 
the problem is redescribed in a frequency format. Gigerenzer interprets this as 
showing that  subjects cannot be demonstrated to be irrational by Bayesian standards. 
However, unlike the advocates of Discovered Preference, he does not seem to believe 
that Bayesian EUT is the only possible normative standard and instead critiques this 
                                                 
8 As Loewenstein points out- how many times can one be outraged by an unfair division of money? 
9 Also known as the “Linda” experiment. Subjects are given a description of “Linda” and are asked the 
likelihood that she is either (a) a bank teller or (b) a bank teller and a feminist. A substantial proportion 
of people choose (b) violating the axioms of probability (since (b) is a subset of (a)). 
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view, pointing out that Bayesianism is controversial in the statistics literature. In spite 
of this dislike of Bayesianism as a normative standard, Gigerenzer’s argument, like 
that of Plott and Binmore, does suggest that the reason for subjects not to obey 
Bayesian rules is because they have “cognitive illusions” as a result of having 
information presented in the “wrong” format. For this reason the two points of view 
can be seen to be similar. 
  It can be seen that there are two different views of understanding at work in 
this debate. On one hand, Binmore and Plott very closely link understanding to 
expected utility. Roughly, being observed maximising expected utility in an 
experiment (holding other errors constant) is the criterion for understanding. If one 
does not maximise expected utility then, excluding other types of subject error, it 
must be because subjects do not understand the experiment. Gigerenzer seems to have 
a looser position than Binmore and Plott in that a subject can be brought to obey a 
certain normative standard (not necessarily EUT) by changing the format of the 
experiment. In this sense they can be said to “understand” the experiment if they have 
a “suitable” format.  
 Cubitt et al and Loewenstein, by contrast, have a pragmatic view of 
understanding. Sources of misunderstanding need to be rooted out empirically and, if 
found, need to be controlled. A subject is assumed to understand an experiment if it is 
properly controlled and the framework is properly tested. Understanding in this 
framework is not attached to one’s performance compared to a normative standard but 
is assessed by direct testing and an empirical view of understanding. This view is 
essentially ad hoc in that there is no explicit theory of understanding underlying the 
reasoning. 
 
3. The Role of Understanding in the Analysis of Decision Theory
 
 The implicit disagreement about the definition of understanding in the 
experimental methodological literature is paralleled by another implicit disagreement 
in the decision theoretical literature. One part of the philosophical discussion about 
rationality in economics has focussed on the normative consequences of violations of 
Expected Utility. As was discussed above, this becomes important in the experimental 
field because of the interpretation, in terms of rationality, given to results in 
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experiments. If too loose an interpretation is given then this will mean that 
experimental tests become virtually useless as tests of “rational” behaviour. 
  In this section it may be useful to see the analysis in experimental terms. Since 
the two authors discussed in this section, Anand (1993) and Broome (1991), are 
discussing normative considerations which apply to all decisions this means that these 
considerations also apply to decisions made in experiments. The normative analysis 
can be seen as mainly applying to the subject in the experiment while the 
experimenter may be seen as an outside observer who sees normatively correct or 
incorrect choices without knowing the subject’ understanding of the experimental 
problems. The line of argument discussed by Broome suggests that the experimenter 
may be taking too constricted a line on what constitutes rational behaviour if she 
declares observed Expected Utility violations to be irrational. 
While there has been a long tradition in economics of regarding expected 
utility as the only possible type of rational behaviour there have been alternatives 
proposed. Indeed Allais’ (1953) original purpose in presenting his paradox was to 
demonstrate the normative point that the independence axiom was not intuitive10. 
Since then there have been a variety of claims for the rationality of various different 
theories. One example of this is Loomes and Sugden (1982) who defend Regret 
Theory by pointing out that it is perfectly reasonable, if one experiences regret, to 
include this emotion in one’s value function. This means that this value function may 
then violate the independence axiom11. 
 However, it has been argued by Broome (1991), Anand (1993) and Tversky12 
(1975) that looking at normative or descriptive observed violations of expected utility 
as violations of rationality depends upon the consequences of a particular choice 
problem being defined in the same way by the theorist and by the agent. Define the 
term “non- separating” as referring to those factors, such as regret, which cause one 
consequence to be influenced by another consequence.  Suppose that there are some 
factors in a choice problem which are non- separating. If the result of this is that 
agents preferences are not consistent with the independence axiom then it is possible 
                                                 
10 Allais was using experimentation in the unusual sense of testing the normative intuitions of his 
subjects, most of whom were experts in the field of choice theory. 
11 In fact Regret Theory can lead to violations of transitivity as well. 
12 Tversky here is commenting on normative aspects of rationality rather than good experimental 
design as when he criticised Binmore. This accounts for the seeming inconsistency of his point of view. 
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for the agent to respecify the consequences to incorporate these factors and so restore 
consistency. 
As an example look at the Allais paradox (Allais 1953): 
 
Lottery 1: Certainty of receiving £10 
 
Lottery 2:  0.05 chance of receiving £20 
                 0.9 chance of receiving £10 
                 0.05 chance of receiving £0 
 
Suppose (as is often the case) that lottery 1 is preferred to lottery 2. 
Subjects then have to choose between two further lotteries: 
 
Lottery 3:  0.1 chance of receiving £10 
                 0.9 chance of receiving £0 
 
Lottery 4:  0.05 chance of receiving £20 
                  0.95 chance of receiving £0 
 
The independence axiom states that, if one follows expected utility it is 
necessary once one has chosen lottery 1 over lottery 2 to choose lottery 3 over lottery 
4. However, there is a tendency amongst many people to choose lottery 4 over lottery 
3 instead. This violates the independence axiom and, to the outside observer, suggests 
that the observer is not maximizing Expected Utility. 
  Suppose that we respecify the consequences of the lotteries and define lottery 1 as: 
        10% of £10 and 90% of £10 
This corresponds with lottery 3: 
         10% of £10 and 90% of £0. 
 
In these two cases we could respecify the 10% state as two different states e.g.: 
 
Lottery 1:10% of  £10 when the alternative is £10; 90% of £10 
Lottery 3: 10% of £10 when the alternative is £0; 90% of £0. 
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This would create new lotteries 1 and 3 for which it would be perfectly 
reasonable to prefer lottery 1 to 2 and lottery 4 to 3. In this way expected utility has 
not been violated since the two 10% states are not the same and so there is no reason 
for them to be treated the same. In this way a simple change in the form of words 
leads to independence being restored and the agent playing these lotteries would be an 
Expected Utility maximizer.  
 The respecification outlined above is what we will refer to as a linguistic 
respecification since it simply reorganises the information available. This differs from 
Broome since much of his argument is actually based around examples where 
respecification involves incorporating psychological variables into the payoffs such as 
Regret or Disappointment. As we mentioned earlier, we will ignore these variables 
since they do not come within our definition of understanding. However, Broome’s 
argument applies equally well to linguistic as well as to behavioural respecification 
and so the argument will be on the former rather than the latter. From this point 
onwards when “respecification” is mentioned then it will be linguistic rather than 
behavioural. 
  It will be argued here that the process of linguistic respecification outlined 
above is a reinterpretation of  the agent’s understanding of the lottery. In their original 
forms the lotteries correspond to what the experimenter understands. However,  once 
respecified then the subject’s understanding has effectively deviated from that of the 
experimenter and their “understandings” can be said to be different13. In terms of 
interpretation (b) in the introduction, the agent now has a “correct” understanding of 
the lottery. 
 However, as has been pointed out by Sen (1985), Machina (1981) and indeed 
Anand and Broome, this respecification story is not sufficient to support the 
normative (or descriptive) status of Expected Utility Theory simply because it lacks 
content. If any set of lotteries can be respecified to support Expected Utility Theory 
then it follows that none can be excluded and so Expected Utility loses all normative 
force. Respecification needs to be restricted in order for it to be useful. 
Broome’s  solution to this problem is through an idea called the “rational 
individuation of justifiers”. This determines whether two states can be distinguished 
as separate or whether they should be merged into one state. Two states can be said to 
                                                 
13 Since we are looking at normative considerations here, we do not have to look at other types of 
subject error. 
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be different if it is rational to have a preference between them14. This allows for a 
subject to determine whether it is reasonable or not to differentiate between two 
states. It also has the advantage that it gets around the problem of lack of content in 
that some states (those where agents are indifferent) cannot be distinguished. Broome 
claims that, given the rational individuation of justifiers, the independence axiom has 
content but there are no counter examples. 
  Broome’s  principle has been severely criticised in the literature. One criticism 
(by Temkin 1994) is that it is difficult to think of a situation where some rational 
preference in Broome’s sense could not be invented. Temkin points out that in 
situations where we commonly accept complementarities (for example having red 
wine with red meat),  we can most easily distinguish states (so the state “red wine and 
beef” is commonly seen as different from “White wine and beef”). In this case it is 
certainly rational to have a preference between the two states. However, if this is true 
then one must dispute whether Broome’s principle really does have any content. If 
complementarities always result in a rational preference once consequences are 
respecified then the principle is empty of content. 
   Another criticism, briefly mentioned by Hausman (1993), is to question the 
scope of Broome’s principle. If the principle works in the area of decision theory then 
it should also work in other areas of economics such as consumer theory. In this case 
there are certainly complementarities between goods since consumer theory assumes 
that goods are complements or substitutes for each other. While these goods could (or 
indeed should according to Broome’s principle) be redefined to remove these 
complementarities this would be an unnecessary complication to the theory of 
consumer choice. 
    Anand (1993) has put forward a different analysis of the respecification of 
states. He concentrates on the transitivity axiom rather than the independence 
axiom15. Anand  argues that it is always possible to respecify states so that transitivity 
is not violated and expresses  this in terms of a “translation theorem” which states that 
all transitive behaviour can be redescribed as intransitive behaviour and vice versa. 
Transitivity is presented as an essentially linguistic phenomenon. Linguistic 
conventions are used to assess whether choice behaviour is transitive or not. When 
                                                 
14 Note that this does not say that one does have a preference- merely that it would be rational to have 
one. “Rational” is not well- defined here (it cannot be expected utility since this would lead to circular 
reasoning) but the emphasis is on “preference” rather than “indifference”.   
15 Although he states that his analysis is more general 
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new conventions are specified then this affects one’s judgement on the transitivity of 
choices. These conventions are essentially arbitrary and so without agreement on 
these conventions there is no possibility of finding out whether an agent’s behaviour 
obeys rational choice or not. Anand draws the implication that for axioms to have 
content they must be accompanied by rules for constructing the states over which the 
axioms are defined i.e. there must be agreement on the linguistic conventions. For the 
axioms to have normative content, this means that these linguistic conventions would 
need to be conventions of a “rational language”. Anand claims that the idea of such a 
language is incoherent. 
Anand derives the notion of a "rational language" from Hirsch (1988). In his 
paper Hirsch tries to formulate a set of rules which would create a “good” language - 
namely one that would exclude “strange” concepts such as "grue"- green before a 
certain date and blue after - or "gricular" , green and circular. Hirsch looked at a broad 
class of possible rules, covering metaphysical rules, epistemological rules, rules for 
explanatory power, pragmatic rules and rules for learning ability and found that there 
were no plausible rules in any of these categories which excluded strange concepts 
such as "grue" etc. Anand believes that a “rational language” is one which can 
exclude all such strange concepts. 
Anand concludes that the only way in which we can determine whether a 
subject is transitive or not in descriptive Expected Utility Theory is with respect to a 
"specified language" which has been given a priori. Anand's conclusion seems to be 
negative- it is not really possible to have a transitivity axiom with normative content, 
while for it to have content at all requires agreement on linguistic conventions. 
  However, it is not clear why Anand believes that a "rational language" in this 
particular sense is essential for transitivity to have normative content. All that Hirsch 
shows  is that there are no rules to exclude "strange concepts" from a language. In 
principle, of course, this would mean that there is no reason to believe that one 
language rather than another is better when attempting to linguistically divide the 
world "at the joints". However, it is normatively unclear why one language rather than 
another  would make a “better” or “more rational” base for decision theory. Hirsch’s 
results do not give us a basis for declaring a language “rational” or “irrational”. 
Instead it would seem that the best language for a rational person to speak would be 
one in which they would be understood by other people. Rationality would then be 
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built on a given language rather than trying to find a rational language to go with 
rational actions16. 
Given these two viewpoints on normative theory it is interesting to ask how 
the concept of understanding fits in to these frameworks. We have defined a linguistic 
respecification as a change in the subject’s understanding of the experiment so we can 
see that Broome’s principle, when applied to this type of respecification, simply acts 
as a constraint on the number of different subject understandings which are 
permissible without becoming irrational. In general this is quite broad as Broome’s 
principle would accept that a large number of respecifications would be rational. 
Normatively, there is no reason for any more than a loose restriction on the number of 
understandings permissible and it may be reasonable for a subject in an experiment 
not to have the same understanding as the experimenter as long as they maximise 
utility with this understanding.  
Anand’s  views are more extreme than Broome’s and lead to a pessimistic 
view of understanding. Unless we have the subjects’ representations of the problem 
then we cannot tell whether their understanding corresponds with the experimenter or 
not. In particular, there is no a priori criterion which would govern whether a person’s 
understanding is or isn’t reasonable. It follows that there is no normative restrictions 
on the type of understanding held by the subject and that there is no particular reason 
to have one understanding over another. On the other hand, Anand’s views on subject 
representations do include a possible solution for the descriptive problem, namely 
agreed linguistic conventions. It is to these that we shall return in the next section. 
  
4. Another criterion for understanding: Gricean ideas on meaning 
 
 So far we have looked at the subject of understanding in economic decision 
making and experiments. The subject is not easy to analyse because, quite often, the 
idea of understanding is conflated with other notions. In general we have found that 
there are a variety of possible criteria for understanding, ranging from Anand’s notion 
that it is virtually impossible to have a normative criterion of understanding, through 
Cubitt et al.’s pragmatic view of understanding to the ideas of “Discovered 
                                                 
16 Indeed, given that a “rational” language in Anand’s terms would not be our own and would not be 
generally known, it must be questioned how rational it would be to use such a language. 
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Preference” where only if one maximises utility can one be said to understand a 
problem. 
  In general these views fit in with the notion that there are two types of 
understanding; the experimenter’s and the subject’s and that either of them could be 
mistaken. The subject could be mistaken as to the “proper” normative standard or the 
layout of the task or the experimenter may be mistaken as to the understanding of the 
subject. In both cases there is a divergence of understanding between the subject and 
the experimenter. However, one flaw with these views is to see understanding as 
something which both the experimenter and the subject carry out independently of 
each other. In reality, understanding is often intimately linked to the idea of 
conversation or (more generally) communication. It requires both the person 
communicating and the person receiving the communication in order for the latter to 
understand.  
This is particularly true in an experiment where the experimenter 
communicates instructions and the subject receives them. It may seem strange to 
model an experiment as a conversation but, from the point of view of this analysis,  
this is perfectly reasonable since this conversation does not have to be two sided. 
Only one of the two participants needs to be communicating information while the 
other listens. Furthermore, each subject in the experiment can be construed as having 
a conversation with the experimenter. 
This model of understanding  as being linked to communication also allows an 
analysis of meaning. Understanding is intimately linked to meaning in that when one 
understands the words in a sentence then one also knows the meaning of the sentence. 
Therefore any theory of understanding will  also implicitly suggest a theory of 
meaning. This means that  it is plausible to look for a theory of meaning when one is 
looking for a criterion for understanding. 
The theory of meaning which takes advantage of the communication aspect of 
experiments  is that put forward by Grice (1989)17 and enhanced by Schiffer (1972) 
and Avramides (1989). This theory of meaning can easily be linked up with the idea 
of understanding because of its use of the intentions and responses of the receiver of 
the communication in order to define meaning. Principally it conceptualises meaning 
                                                 
17 Grice’s theory of meaning has been used as a tool of analysis in experiments before- these ideas will 
be discussed later in the paper. 
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as being defined by its use in communication and the responses of the listener to that 
communication. 
Grice’s work on meaning aims to give an analysis of meaning or, in other 
words, to find the criteria for the application of the concept of meaning18. Grice uses a 
series of preliminary  assumptions about speakers and listeners in a conversation (e.g. 
listeners know that speakers may make mistakes or that speakers know the usual 
conventions of language) in order to construct his theory. These are “givens” which 
prepare the ground for the main part of the theory. In the following analysis it is 
assumed that these conditions are fulfilled in an experimental setting. 
Grice’s analysis is based around the notion of an “utterance”. This term is used 
because his theory of meaning covers more than just spoken words. It can include all 
sorts of communication including written words and even symbols or pictures. The 
term “utterance” is a general word which encompasses all of these ideas. Grice 
divides the meaning of an utterance up into several categories. The two which we will 
discuss here are “speaker meaning” and “timeless meaning”. Speaker meaning is the 
meaning of the utterance at a particular point in time, allowing for contextual and 
other non- linguistic factors. Timeless meaning is that part of speaker meaning which 
is constant across utterances- usually the linguistic element. 
  Speaker meaning was the focus of Grice’s main analysis which looked for the 
conditions for which this type of meaning can be necessarily and sufficiently defined. 
Speaker meaning was seen as being basic to the analysis and timeless meaning flowed 
from it. The reason for this is simply because communication consists of far more 
than the timeless meaning of an utterance and so to have full analysis requires one to 
look at the non- linguistic as well as linguistic elements of that utterance. Grice 
(followed by Schiffer and others see Avramides(1989)) proceeded by use of a series 
of definitions which gave the definition of meaning in terms of the speaker’s and 
listener’s knowledge, intentions, beliefs and expectations. We will not go through the 
entire process of definition as it is a complex and subtle argument which is not 
relevant for the analysis here. However it is sufficient to mention that this defines 
speaker meaning for any utterance of a speaker. 
   Grice went on from his definition of speaker meaning to a definition of 
timeless (i.e. language) meaning. In general, timeless meaning is defined by Grice 
                                                 
18 Specifically Grice is looking at “non- natural” meaning i.e. when we say that x means y we are not 
stating that x is caused by y (as in natural meaning) but that y explains x in some way. 
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according to the knowledge of the group in which a speaker is socially situated. If 
other members of this group have a certain utterance in their repertoire of utterances 
then this will cause the speaker to retain the utterance in her own repertoire of 
utterances when trying to convey a similar concept. Furthermore, for timeless 
meaning to function within a language then an utterance must be dependent for its 
occurrence in conversation on non- natural features or a convention- natural features 
depend too much on context to be “timeless”. A language is structured from a series 
of conventions governing utterances in conversation. 
Grice never really gave a fully coherent account of timeless meaning so the 
“Gricean” account of timeless meaning which has emerged as the most popular is that 
of Schiffer (1972) (See Avramides 1989). Schiffer related timeless meaning to the 
idea of a convention as defined by Lewis (1969). In this view a convention is seen as 
a coordination game19 between the speaker and the listener in a conversation. When 
they manage to coordinate on a meaning for an utterance then this meaning, after 
repetition of this coordination over a period of time, would become a convention and 
so part of the language. This idea of the timeless meaning of a word as a convention 
allows for language to be seen as an autonomous entity. A sentence may be uttered 
and the words have meaning even if that meaning is different from the meaning under 
the Gricean account of speaker meaning. 
  In fact it is an essential part of Grice’s account of meaning that there may be a 
divergence between the timeless meaning of an utterance and the speaker meaning. It 
is this divergence which allows for what is known as “conversational implicature”. A 
conversational implicature emerges simply because an utterance by a speaker may 
have meaning beyond the formal meaning of the words (i.e. timeless meaning). 
Grice assumed that one could analyse conversational implicature using the 
idea of a conversation being, by its very nature, a cooperative affair20. Each 
participant in a conversation has a common purpose or direction with all the other 
participants. Grice’s “cooperative principle” states that one should make a 
conversational contribution according to the accepted purpose or direction of the 
conversational exchange. This cooperative principle effectively excludes some moves 
in a conversation from the start (e.g. always talking nonsense).  
                                                 
19 Strictly, Schiffer did not see coordination as the motive but rather a desire to understand.  
20 This does not exclude the possibility of lying. However lying is assumed to be a comparatively rare 
event. Otherwise communication would lose its rationale (if everyone lies then there is no point in 
communicating to receive false information). 
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From this cooperative principle Grice derived conversational maxims which 
would ensure the maintenance of the cooperative principle. There are four maxims, 
those of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner. The Quantity maxim is the 
requirement to make one’s contribution as informative as possible but not more 
informative than required. The Quality maxim is the requirement to make what one 
says as truthful as possible without saying false things or things for which one does 
not have evidence. The Relation maxim is simply the requirement that one should be 
relevant. The Manner maxim relates to how one expresses information. So, for 
example, one should avoid ambiguous or absurd expressions and be brief and orderly. 
  These four maxims are the most general possible maxims and apply to most 
types of communication21 but they are not the only maxims possible since other more 
context specific maxims apply to particular situations. Also these four maxims are too 
general because more detailed statements are needed for applications. They need not 
hold all the time for all conversations but if they are violated either by mistake or on 
purpose then this will change the meaning of the words beyond that given by the 
timeless meaning of those words. 
 As has been mentioned before, this can help us to construct a theory of 
understanding. With Grice’s theory of meaning this is comparatively easy since the 
theory is structured in terms of the intentions and knowledge of the person who is 
listening to the speaker. Therefore, if a listener has the reactions which are necessary 
for a certain utterance to have a given meaning then this means that the listener 
understands the utterance to have that meaning. It follows that the conversational 
maxims are necessary criteria for the understanding of the listener as well as defining 
the meaning of an utterance.  
  Grice viewed communication as a special case of purposive rational 
behaviour. People talk in order to achieve the goals of the conversation. They 
generally obey the conversational maxims because this means that conversational 
exchanges will be profitable. If people do not obey the maxims then meaning may be 
lost or changed and so people’s goals will not be satisfied. Therefore Grice did not see 
the maxims just as criteria of meaning but also as rules with normative force. Schiffer 
extended this normative idea to timeless meaning. Insofar as timeless meaning is 
                                                 
21 There are of course, exceptions; poetry for example would break some or all of these maxims. 
However one would expect poetry not to conform to these maxims. A poetry reading involves a 
deliberate flouting of the maxims, with the audience understanding and expecting this. 
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based on  conventions  within the linguistic community then it follows that there is a 
normative reason to obey these conventions. If a person does not obey these 
conventions then they risk not being understood and so violate the cooperative nature 
of the conversation. 
It should be noted that the rationality of both the conversational maxims and 
timeless meaning is not that of individual rationality as posited by conventional 
economics. Its cooperative features are more akin to the notion of “team thinking” put 
forward by Sugden (1993). In this mode of thinking each person tries to “play their 
part” in achieving outcomes that are good for all. Actions are not considered in 
isolation but instead take the actions of others into account. In order to achieve these 
outcomes there must be a recognition that there is a “team” in existence so that 
expectations can be coordinated around what is best for this team. In a coordination 
game for example a person who wishes to coordinate on a Pareto- superior outcome 
with their opponent will have to take into account what their opponent is thinking in 
order to successfully coordinate.  The same notion of team thinking operates in 
Grice’s notion of the cooperative principle. In this, the team is the speaker and listener 
who have a mutual interest in forwarding the conversation. 
 
 
   5. Application of Gricean ideas to experimental situations
 
 The application of Grice’s ideas to the experimental and decision- theoretic 
problems outlined in the first two sections have briefly been mentioned. In this section 
we will examine this subject in more detail. First we will discuss how Grice’s theory 
fits into the experimental setting as a theory of understanding. Secondly we will 
discuss the use of Grice’s conversational maxims in constructing tests of 
understanding. Finally, there will be a discussion of the differences between Grice’s 
ideas on understanding and the other criteria discussed above. 
  Grice’s theory of meaning provides a criterion for understanding in 
experiments because experiments tend to involve a conversation between the 
experimenter on one hand and subjects on the other. It is a one sided conversation in 
that the experimenter is talking and the subjects try to understand what the 
experimenter is trying to say about the experiment (although sometimes subjects may 
ask questions). The “conversation” is not purely oral since much of the 
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communication takes place using examples, illustrations and practice run- throughs. 
The content of the communication between the experimenter and the subjects includes 
the structure of the tasks done in the experiments including (in lottery experiments) 
the distinguishing of outcomes. 
Since subjects are recruited voluntarily to the experiment and, in economic 
experiments at least, are provided with an incentive, so subjects have an interest in 
discovering how the experiment works. Also, given that there is no deception in the 
experiment , the main motivation of the experimenter is to ensure that the subjects do 
the experiment according to the instructions. This means that the two sides of this 
“conversation” have a common purpose in making sure that the subjects understand 
what is going on in the experiment. 
  Given that the instructions are given in a language which is in the repertoire of 
the subjects22, then the “timeless” meaning of the experimenter’s utterances should be 
fairly straightforward. However, there is still a large gap between the timeless 
meaning of a communication and the meaning which the subjects pick up. This gap in 
communication is filled by the conversational maxims. The maxims apply because the 
cooperative principle applies in this case since the subjects and experimenter have a 
common purpose in the experiment. 
  It follows that, when designing an experiment, an experimenter needs, at least 
implicitly, to bear in mind the implications of the four maxims. Any violation of these 
maxims may result in an unintentionally different meaning being given to the subject. 
This obviously applies not only to the formal instructions given to subjects but also to 
examples, tests of understanding and the structure of the experiment. The latter is 
important since it has been shown (Schwarz 1996) that the layout of the experiment 
itself can have a significant effect on how people choose.  
When discussing the maxims in the context of experiments it must be 
remembered that Grice’s discussion of meaning did not take place in a void but was 
supported by several givens. This included the context of the conversation (i.e. the 
experiment), the background knowledge of the participants and common knowledge 
of relevant items in the experiment. All of these things are important in any discussion 
of  the methods of a particular experiment. As an example, the “context” of the 
experiment is particularly relevant to discussions about the “realism” of experiments 
                                                 
22 This is an important point- there has been much informal debate about whether subjects (in the UK) 
should be used when their  first language is not English.  
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(see Starmer(1999)). However, although important, these factors are not immediately 
relevant to our discussion here. 
The application of the Gricean maxims to economic experiments is already 
reflected in some of the rules mentioned earlier. As already mentioned, the Quality 
maxim relates very closely to the general methodological prohibition against deceit in 
economic experiments. However it also relates closely to the unease which many 
experimentalists have with the use of problems with hypothetical incentives or with 
the use of “cover stories”. There is quite often the feeling that, by using hypothetical 
incentives, subjects are not answering “real” problems since the hypothetical 
incentives can be seen as false information for the subject. Similar objections can be 
made against the use of cover stories. 
The Quantity maxim also has obvious applications. Repetition of phrases in 
instructions often leads to confusion because it suggests importance where there may 
be none. By contrast the provision of too little information means that the subject does 
not understand what is going on and so may not perform correctly in the experiment. 
However it should be noted that experiments by their very nature “flout” the Quantity 
maxim in that they do not give all the information necessary to come to a unique 
solution to the experimental problem. There are always choices which need to be 
made by the subject23. Experimental sessions therefore will always exclude some 
relevant information. However this particular flouting of the maxim should not matter 
as the subjects expect the Quantity maxim to be flouted in this way in an experimental 
setting. 
 The third maxim, that of Relation, is also important in economic experiments. 
All instructions and examples must be relevant to the task in hand and the information 
must not include anything which may distract the subject. There are also more subtle 
questions relating to this maxim. The task and instructions must be structured to give 
a clear direction for the subjects to gain their rewards which requires that the task and 
instructions must be so designed as to be relevant for this purpose. Relevance is also 
another argument, together with the Quality maxim,  against hypothetical situations or 
incentives. If these situations are not seen as relevant to the surroundings or context of 
the experiment then this may impair subjects’ understanding of the problem. 
                                                 
23 Indeed Thaler’s (1988) objection to Binmore’s (see Binmore 1999) experiment on the Ultimatum 
game was precisely that by telling subjects to maximise their earnings, Binmore was giving the 
subjects too much information.   
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The Relation maxim is also important when discussing whether repetition of 
tasks, as in the Discovered Preference hypothesis, is a good method for promoting 
understanding in experiments. While there are some grounds for this in terms of the 
Quantity maxim (i.e. giving the subject sufficient information) it seems less 
persuasive when analyzed using the Relation maxim. A subject may  be puzzled about 
the point of continual repetitions of the task since many repetitions in such a short 
space of time are unusual. Also, as Schwarz (1996) points out, there is a presumption 
that repetition of identical tasks is redundant so subjects may try to reinterpret the 
repetitions of the task in a way which may use irrelevant information. It may be 
difficult to explain these repetitions without giving away the purpose of the 
experiment. 
  The final maxim, that of Manner, is likewise of crucial importance in 
experimental design. The requirements that one should avoid obscurity and ambiguity 
are obviously important when promoting greater transparency within an experiment. 
The requirement that one be brief and orderly reflects the desire that experiments 
should not be too complicated and that instructions should not be too long- winded. 
 Since Grice’s notion of meaning does have relevance to the question of 
understanding in economic experiments, this means that it is of interest to compare it 
with the criteria for understanding given above. The four theories chosen , in order, 
will be those of Binmore and Plott, Broome, Anand and Cubitt et al24. The analysis 
will be in terms of the underlying rationales for the criteria (or lack of criteria!) of 
understanding and whether the Gricean notion is consistent with them. 
  The “Discovered Preference” hypothesis has been discussed and critiqued in 
section 2. From this it is worth noting that the motivating factor behind it is the idea 
that one can only possibly understand the experiment (allowing for other possible 
errors) if one is maximising utility. This is based on the idea that a subject’s “true” 
preferences are always consistent with EU and that any observed deviation must be 
the result of an error, possibly involving understanding. If no other type of error is 
made, then it is not possible to understand the experiment and not maximise EU. 
This contrasts heavily with the Gricean view of understanding. This view does 
not identify understanding with whether the subject is observed to be maximising 
expected utility within the experiment. Instead it focuses on the interaction between 
                                                 
24 We will ignore Gigerenzer’s notion as it adds little to the discussion being a variant (from the point 
of view of understanding) of the Discovered Preference Hypothesis. 
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the experimenter and the subject. The cooperative principle states that these two 
agents do try to increase the subject’s understanding of the experiment because there 
is a common purpose, although the motivations are different. However, this process of 
gaining understanding is independent of the subjects’ own process of utility 
maximization. The method by which a subject gains a prize on having full 
understanding is not assumed to be under the direct control of the experimenter.   
A similar argument can be made against Broome’s (implicit) theory of 
understanding. Given the cooperative principle, if the conversational maxims are 
fulfilled this should result in the subjects having the same understanding of the 
problem as the experimenter. Furthermore, the cooperative principle implies that there 
is no incentive for the subject to deviate from this understanding. A redescription of 
outcomes by the subject would violate the principle. 
 For both the Discovered Preference Hypothesis and Broome’s ideas it should 
be emphasised that full understanding by the subject does not mean that the subject 
would maximise utility in the experiment itself. They may in fact have a completely 
different idea of the best way to choose (so they may, for example, choose according 
to Regret Theory). However since to the subject the way they choose is the best way, 
it is perfectly consistent to obey the cooperative principle and violate expected utility. 
Full understanding and expected utility maximization are two separate and different 
goals. 
At the opposite end of the “understanding” spectrum is Anand’s argument. As 
mentioned above, Anand does not believe that there is any linguistic base upon which 
we can rationally distinguish between states of the world and so it is reasonable to 
respecify outcomes in a problem in any way one wishes25. Anand bases this belief 
upon the idea that there is no such thing as a “rational” language which can exclude 
such redescriptions. However, this is a peculiar position to take. It is not necessary for 
a language to exclude one set of descriptions and prioritise another set. All that is 
necessary is that the agent understands, in a particular situation, which is the most 
appropriate description to use. 
There have been a variety of suggestions as to how to do this (see the “natural 
kinds” literature (Quine 1969, Putnam 1975) for an alternative). However, Grice’s 
analysis provides the most natural analysis for an experimental situation and is a 
                                                 
25 Although the existence of agreed linguistic conventions may mean that in practice there is an agreed 
distinguishing of outcomes. 
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widely accepted approach for defining meaning (and so understanding). If a word has 
timeless meaning in a language shared by the experimenter and the subject then this 
implies that this meaning is a convention in the language. If it is a convention then, 
given the cooperative principle, it is rational for the subject to use that meaning rather 
than any other meaning. It follows that the correct individuation of states is provided 
by the experimenter to the subject26 and that a cooperative subject will follow this 
individuation. It follows from this that Anand’s pessimism is unwarranted in an 
experimental situation.   
The final position is that of Cubitt et al. Their position is essentially pragmatic, 
based on empirical testing and controls within the experiment. There is no “criterion” 
as such, just a set of rules of thumb derived either from experience in experimental 
practice or from contexts outside the experimental or economics arena. The big flaw 
with this approach is its ad hoc structure. There is no particular theoretical reason to 
believe that the bank of tests, instructions and practice rounds given to the average 
subject will necessarily improve understanding. 
Grice’s work however fits in very well with this view of understanding. There 
is an a priori assumption that subjects are trying to understand the experiment (i.e. the 
cooperative principle), while there are features which allow for controlling the 
experiment in case the subjects do not understand it (i.e. the conversational maxims). 
Furthermore there is no link between utility theory in the choices made and 
understanding; it is possible for a subject to understand an experiment and still fail to 
maximise expected utility. 
  This “Gricean” view of understanding therefore can act as a structuring theory 
for the pragmatism of Cubitt et al. It does not explicitly derive proposals for how 
understanding can be improved (although the structure may inspire more tests) but it 
does provide a taxonomy within which experimentalists can work. Furthermore, it 
provides a normative reason (the cooperative principle ) for why it is rational to work 
on the assumption that subjects do generally try to understand experimental 
instructions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 It could be said that a “rational” language in this case is simply the one which the experimenter is 
using! 
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6. Other applications of Gricean theories to experiments 
 
 While there has been no general comparison of Grices ideas to notions of 
understanding  in experimental economics and decision theory, there have been other 
attempts to discuss the implications of Grice’s theories in the general experimental 
field. Some of these have used Grice’s conversational maxims as controls on 
experiments while others have discussed the implications of violating maxims when 
looking at some classic “violations” of rationality. 
              Two works which have explicitly discussed Grice’s ideas in an experimental 
context are those of Schwarz (1996) and Hilton (1995). Their work has been empirical 
in that they have demonstrated the empirical applicability of Grice’s maxims to 
psychological theory and have carried out tests of this applicability. According to 
Schwarz and Hilton, many experiments which have resulted in what have been 
acknowledged to be “biases” in the literature are in fact the result of violations of 
Gricean conversational maxims i.e. in the terms of this paper their understanding 
differs from that of the experimenter. In general, the idea is that subjects, rather than 
being irrational, in many cases are actually being rational within a different 
interpretation of the question. The subject is not being awkward and in fact is obeying 
the cooperative principle, but the different understanding is the result of   the 
experimenter violating the maxims of conversation. 
An example of this is the Base Rate fallacy. This is based on a classic 
experiment by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) where subjects are each given a 
description of a person which excludes details of that person’s career. This description 
was said to have been formulated by psychologists and to have come from a group of 
100 such descriptions of people of which 30 of the people were engineers and 70 were 
lawyers (or vice versa depending on the treatment). The subjects were then asked 
whether that person was an engineer or a lawyer. It was found that there was an 
overwhelming reliance on the description as opposed to the base- rate for the answer 
even though there was no explicit clue in the description.  
However it has been shown (by Schwarz) that this is not robust to changes in 
presentation. The assumption of relevance (i.e. the Relation maxim) means that all of 
the information will be used by the subject even if at first sight it seems irrelevant. 
The focus on the description and on the role of psychologists in selecting it out are all 
assumed to be relevant and it is this which causes neglect of the base- rate. However, 
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when these are controlled then the effect disappears. In this case it is the experimenter 
who has violated the conversational maxims by focussing on irrelevant information 
and the subject is trying to make sense of it by assuming that the maxims hold. 
Other possible violations of conversational maxims in experiments include 
leading questions which can lead to “false memory” of issues asked about in the 
questions. Also important are “assertions of the obvious” where instructions include 
statements which are obviously true. Rational conversationalists would not make such 
obvious statements and subjects may start to look for hidden meanings. Repeated 
questions are also violations of conversational maxims since they seem to invite 
different responses from those given previously. Many so- called “measurement 
artefacts” are in fact violations of conversational maxims. For example, the use of 
open questions may lead to a variety of different answers because of the lack of 
information. (Schwarz 1996) 
These and other biases are to a certain extent an interpretation of the existing 
evidence in terms of the Gricean Maxims. As both Hilton and Schwarz admit, the 
maxims are simply another useful tool in the experimental armoury- they should not 
be seen as a general cause for all experimental problems. Violations of rationality and 
artefacts in experiments are not all caused by violations of the maxims since the latter 
tend to have multiple causes. Schwarz and Hilton’s general conclusion is that Grice’s 
maxims are a serious methodological issue which needs to be tackled in experiments. 
For Schwarz and Hilton the main focus is empirical i.e. finding hypotheses for 
explaining anomalies rather than finding a normative and descriptive theory of 
understanding as in this paper. However their analysis does give support to the idea 
that subjects do actually assume Grice’s maxims in conversation. 
 While Schwarz and Hilton’s  analysis is geared towards empirical hypotheses 
about experimentation there are other theorists who have used Grice’s maxims for 
more philosophical purposes. The ideas which will be discussed here are those of 
Todorov (1997) which, if true, would completely overturn the argument made so far 
in this paper. Todorov’s claim is simple- that, not only are Grice’s maxims important 
in experimental studies but also, when violated, they are the cause (contrary to Hilton 
and Schwarz) of many of the violations of rationality seen in the literature. Todorov’s 
position is more complex than this makes it sound since he subscribes to Cohen’s 
(1981) view that it is not possible to test human rationality as such since 
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“normativity” is actually derived from human intuition27. Human “competence” at 
rational thought therefore is not in doubt while there may be some errors in human 
“performance”. 
  However, no critique is offered of the latter views here. Instead we will 
concentrate on Todorov’s claims about Grice’s axioms. Todorov makes two claims: 
 
i) It is always possible to find an explanation of “violations of rationality” in 
terms of  violations of Gricean maxims. 
 
    ii) Cognitive illusions can be avoided by an “appropriate” representation. 
 
    It can be seen immediately that these claims simply replicate the positions 
which we argued against earlier. Claim (i) could be seen as a variant on the 
Discovered Preference Hypothesis except that “subject error” is replaced by 
“violation of the maxims” as the main culprit. Meanwhile (ii) is Todorov’s extension 
of Gigerenzer’s opinion which is explained  by stating that an “inappropriate” 
representation is one where the subject is confused and violates one of the 
conversational maxims. These are both complete turnarounds in the previous 
arguments and, at first glance, seem to reinforce the Discovered Preference or 
Broome’s/ Anand’s position. The claim here is that this conclusion is premature since 
its reasoning is too extreme. 
 Todorov’s claims are reinforced by two examples; one is the Wason Selection 
Task (Wason 1968) and the other is the Base Rate Fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky 
1973) which we have already discussed. Here we will discuss just the Selection Task 
as the general arguments used for this also apply to the Base Rate Fallacy and also 
because there is some limited evidence on Todorov’s claims about the Selection Task. 
The Selection Task is an experiment which tests subjects’ ability to carry out 
conditional reasoning. The original experiment (Wason 1968) involved a layout of 
four double- sided cards, each of which had a letter on one side and a number on the 
other. The layout had the letters and numbers  “2”, “3”, “A”  and “B” face up. Given 
this layout, the subject was told to pick the minimum number of cards to test the 
                                                 
27 While not presenting a critique of this view it is worth pointing out that, while normative rules do 
originally derive from human intuition they are refined over time. Aristotelean syllogisms, for example, 
may be derived from intuition but a 100- page proof in modern predicate logic certainly isn’t. 
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conditional statement “If a card has a vowel on one side then it has an even number 
on the other. The rational  choice (according to Wason) was to choose cards A and 3 
but most subjects chose the “positive confirming” cards A and 2. The latter card is 
irrelevant for testing the statement since it cannot falsify it. Since Wason’s original 
paper a whole range of variants of the task have been carried out which have extended 
this conclusion and have shown some of its limitations. 
    Todorov makes several claims about the Selection Task but two are relevant 
here. First of all he notes that, while the Selection Task may be performed badly in 
many circumstances, there are others such as the “Deontic” tasks (i.e. where the 
statements tested are normative rules) where subjects perform well ( see Cheng & 
Holyoak 1985). Todorov interprets this as being the result of deontic tasks being more 
“relevant” than the other versions of the task. Since people are used to following 
deontic rules it follows that a task involving such rules is more likely to be done well 
than one which is abstract. 
   Todorov also makes claims about the interpretation of the rule used. He points 
out that the English interpretation of the conditional used in the rules is an “if… then” 
statement. However, in colloquial English this could be misinterpreted as a 
biconditional or as an existential conjunction, both of which could lead to incorrect 
results. He claims that it is possible, using a different logical interpretation of the 
conditional28, to induce subjects to give the correct answer. This is justified on the 
grounds of cognitive ease, although he presents no empirical results to justify this. 
      Todorov’s arguments are interesting but not convincing. In an experiment 
carried out with Bob Sugden (Jones and Sugden 2001) we investigated the Selection 
Task, attempting to control for precisely these points29. The phrasing of the rule was 
changed to “Every X is Y” which gives the conditional in a more explicit manner. 
This had the advantage of reinforcing the conditional without eliminating its 
conditional character. This did not result in the disappearance of the anomaly, 
showing that the ambiguity of the “If.. then” statement was probably not responsible 
for the bias. Furthermore, the argument in favour of “Relevance” as what is driving 
the large amount of correct answers in deontic tasks seems to be false. 
Experimentally, when we controlled for realism using abstract and “realistic” 
                                                 
28 Specifically for an item x and features P and Q of x the conditional (∀x, Px → Qx) can be interpreted 
as (¬∃x Px & ¬Qx). 
29 Although not in reaction to Todorov’s claims. 
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examples with deontic and non- deontic statements in both cases, the deontic 
statements worked just as well whatever the level of realism. Whatever is driving the 
success of deontic statements it is not their familiarity30.  
      While these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive they do 
demonstrate that Todorov’s arguments are not necessarily correct. However, a more 
interesting point is that Todorov’s  theories are in fact testable. Todorov’s claims 
would only hold if it was never possible to satisfy Grice’s maxims in the conventional 
form of the Selection Task- this is far too pessimistic an interpretation and can be 
shown by empirical testing to be false. Grice’s maxims are not an a priori logical 
block to testing rationality, but rather they are empirical hypotheses which can be 
tested in the laboratory. It may have been the case that Todorov was correct for the 
Wason Selection Task. However, this does not detract from the fact that this would 
have to be tested experimentally rather than assumed a priori and that the presentation 
and explication of the Selection Task could be changed to eliminate these problems. 
    Interpreting the evidence here, Todorov’s two claims are not universally true.  
Violations of rationality are not always traceable to violations of Gricean maxims and 
cognitive illusions cannot always be cured by an appropriate representation. However, 
aside from the empirical evidence, the second claim may be doubted for other 
reasons. Why, for example, should one test a subject’s ability to carry out conditional 
reasoning, as in the Selection Task, by giving the subject representationally different 
but logically equivalent non- conditional statements? It may be the case that the new 
non- conditional representation allows the subject to answer “correctly” but not all 
problems are constructed in this way. We are interested in how people use  
conditionals in general rather than just in particular cases and the general failure of 
reasoning associated with conditionals when represented as conditionals is an 
important fact which cannot be argued away by claiming that a different non- 
conditional representation should be used.  
       Rather than completely disposing of the conditional form as suggested by 
Todorov  it may be better simply to rephrase the rule as a more explicit conditional. 
This fits in with the Gricean maxims (by obeying the maxim of Manner and removing 
obscurity) and allows a test of conditionality. Doing otherwise leads one to doubt 
what one is testing- a formulation may be logically equivalent to a conditional but if it 
                                                 
30 It is also worth pointing out that another of Todorov’s claims- that the subjects are really acting like 
Bayesians as suggested by Oaksford and Chater (1994) has also been proved wrong.  
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is not presented as a conditional then can one really say that one is testing 
conditionals? 
 
7. Conclusion
 
 The main thrust of this paper has been to discuss the role of Grice’s 
Conversational maxims within experimental economics. The general conclusion is 
that they can be used to provide a coherent set of criteria of understanding within 
experiments. This set of criteria for understanding, it has been argued, makes more 
sense in the experimental setting than other possible rivals. 
    Crucially the main argument in this paper has been towards a 
“commonsensical” view of understanding in experiments. Grice’s analysis was 
precisely that- an analysis of the notion of “meaning” as it is used in ordinary 
language rather than in a complex philosophical model. One of the arguments he 
made in favour of the cooperative principle was that this was precisely how people 
did communicate. 
    This means that the analysis here endorses a pragmatic, commonsense view of 
understanding as put forward by Cubitt et al.  It follows that it is possible to 
understand an experiment and yet be “irrational”. It is also possible for the subject to 
come to understand the experiment in the same way that the experimenter understands 
it. Subjects do not repecify the problem in order to fit in with their own (consistent) 
preferences and there is a baseline criterion for understanding by the subject. 
    The implication of this is that the notion of understanding becomes empirical 
and practically testable. This contrasts sharply with Plott’s (1996) claim that 
Discovered Preference was a philosophy or means of interpreting the data rather than 
a testable theory. One of the claims of this paper is precisely that understanding is 
testable and can be tested independently of whether a subject is irrational or not. This 
also opens up the possibility that Discovered Preference as a theory about learning 
(i.e. that all subjects will eventually come to understand an experiment through 
learning and repetition) is also testable. This has been shown through the discussion 
of repetition and the Relation and Quantity maxims. 
   While this paper fits in with the Cubitt et al. position in the economics 
literature it also fits in with the methodological discussion which has been developed 
by Schwarz and Hilton. While their work has focussed on the problem of how the 
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Gricean maxims could be used to make sure that experiments are constructed 
correctly, this paper extends this to looking at ideas about understanding in the 
experimental economics literature and in particular looking at normative aspects. The 
Hilton and Schwarz papers could be seen as applications and tests of the “Gricean” 
ideas about understanding discussed in this paper so the two streams of thought are 
complementary. 
     Grice’s theory of meaning and our adapted theory of understanding rely on 
subject and experimenter being in a conversation with each other. It may be argued 
that this is a special case and that there are many situations where people have to 
make choices but are not in a conversation. This is a valid point but is should be 
remembered that Grice’s theory is far more general than it appears. A “conversation” 
(in this context) need not be to specific people, be oral or happen at the same time for 
the “speaker” and “listener”. A diary or a warning on a wall for example, both count 
as “conversations” in this context. Indeed any communication in society could be 
brought under the Gricean theory of meaning31. 
  It follows that the arguments given in this paper have an importance way 
beyond that of experimentation. However, the principle aim of this paper is to 
regularise the notions of understanding in experiments and Grice’s theory of meaning 
provides an excellent means to do this task. Perhaps the best argument in favour of a 
Gricean view is that it makes most sense in an experimental context compared to the 
other views. Its view of understanding chimes in with the assumptions that most 
experimenters make while at the same time allowing for sensible tests of whether 
subjects are rational or not. Under this view, experiments are a method for testing 
theories and collecting data rather than vehicles for detecting “appropriate 
applications” of theories which have a priori been declared to be true. 
  
  
  
 
   
 
                                                 
31 However, natural phenomena such as are investigated by natural sciences do not have their 
“meaning” defined by Grice. 
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